Pacific
War
Even before
Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and the American military
chiefs had agreed on a common strategy with Great Britain:
Germany, the most powerful and dangerous of the Axis powers,
must be defeated first. Only enough military resources would be
devoted to the Pacific to hold the Japanese west of the
Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defensive line.
The Pacific
was a naval war, and little U.S. Naval power was required in the
Atlantic. Aside from the U-boats, the Germans posed no threat in
the Atlantic waters. Almost the entire British Navy was deployed
in the Atlantic, thus, American naval power could be committed
to the Pacific war.
From the
beginning of the war, rivalry between the Army and the Navy
marked the conflict. The inter-service rivalries and great
distances prevented a single unified commander from being named.
Instead, the Pacific was divided into area commands. General
MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and Admiral Chester
Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas (POA). The POA, in turn, was
subdivided into North Pacific, Central Pacific, and South
Pacific commands. Admiral Nimitz retained commander of the
Central Pacific. General MacArthur became Supreme Commander
Allied Powers (SCAP) in the last days of the war.
Fighting in
the Pacific was unlike fighting in Europe. The Pacific was a
seemingly endless series of amphibious landings and
island-hopping campaigns where naval power, air power, and
shipping were of primary importance. The soldiers and marines
who assaulted the countless beaches in the Pacific war was
brutal and deadly. Japanese defenders always dug in, reinforced
their bunkers with coconut logs, and fought until they were
killed. They almost never surrendered.
Japan,
largely lacking of natural resources to feed its industries,
looked overseas for supplies of strategic materials such as ore
and petroleum. Before 1939, the U.S. was Japan's major supplier.
But President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull shut
off American supplies in an effort to force the Japanese to end
hostilities against China. The Japanese had long sought the
resource-rich British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia, and
as the U.S. trade embargo tightened, the Japanese increasingly
looked southward for raw material and strategic resources.
Only the U.S.
stood in Japan's path. The U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor
was the only force capable of challenging Japan's navy, and
American bases in the Philippines could threaten lines of
communications between the Japanese home islands and the East
Indies. Every oil tanker heading for Japan would have to pass by
American-held Luzon.
From these
needs and constraints, Japan's war plans emerged. First, its
navy would neutralize the American fleet with a surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, Japan would also seize American's Central
Pacific bases at Guam and Wake Islands. and invade the
Philippines. With American naval power crippled, Japan's
military would be free to seize Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and
the Dutch East Indies in a series of rapid amphibious
operations. Japan would the establish a defensive ring around
its newly conquered empire by fortifying islands in the south
and central Pacific. Japan's leaders were convinced the
Americans, once involved in the European war, would be willing
to negotiate peace in the Pacific.
To Block
Japanese ambitions, the U.S. Army had scant resources. Two small
forces, the garrison in the Territory of Hawaii and General
Douglas MacArthur's command in the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Both were only peacetime organizations. Yet, these
forces would face overwhelming odds in the event of war. The
thousands of islands that comprised the Philippines lay 8,000
miles from the American west coast, but only 200 miles from
Japanese held Formosa. To defend them, Gen. MacArthur had the
Philippine Scouts. He could call on additional thousands of
Philippine militia, but they were untrained and ill equipped.
Lt. General Walter C. Short's Hawaiian command held 43,000 Army
troops, including tow infantry divisions, coast artillery, air
corps and Support troops. The US had equivalent of three
divisions in the Pacific to stand in the path of the Imperial
Japanese Army.
American
strategists had developed two plans to counter possible Japanese
aggress-the Navy to fight across the central pacific for battle
with the Japanese fleet. The Army saw no way to save the
Philippines and favored a strategic defense along an
Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line. Seaman William Jewe was in the
U.S. Coast Guard manning these defensive
perimeter.
All of the
efforts proved to be too little, too late. The Japanese worked
to perfection. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese paralyzed the
Pacific Fleet in its attack on Pearl Harbor. In the Philippines,
Japanese fliers destroyed most of General MacArthur’s Japanese
air force on the ground. Japanese forces took Burma, Malaya,
Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies in rapid succession. By
March 1942, the Japanese had conquered an empire. Only
General MacArthur's American-Filipino army still held out on the
main island of Luzon.
A Japanese
army landed in northern Luzon on 22 December 1941 and
began to push southward toward Manila. Al first General
MacArthur was inclined to meet the Japanese on the beaches, but
he had no air force and the U.S. Navy's tiny Asiatic fleet was
in no position to challenge Japan at sea. The U.S. regulars and
Philippine Scouts were excellent
troops but were
outnumbered and without air support. General MacArthur decided
to withdraw to the Bataan peninsula. There he could pursue a
strategy of defense and delay, shortening his line and using the
mountainous, jungle-covered terrain to his advantage. Perhaps he
could even hold out long enough for a relief force to be mounted
in the U.S.
But too many
people were crowded into Bataan, with too little food and
ammunition. By March it was clear that help from the U.S. was
not coming. Nevertheless, the American-Filipino force, wracked
by dysentery and malaria, continued to fight. In March 1941,
President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur to escape to
Australia. He left his command to Lt. General Jonathan
Wainwright and to Major General Edward King, who on 9 April
was forced to surrender the exhausted and starving Bataan force.
General Wainwright continued to resist on the small fortified
island of Corregidor in Manila Bay until 6 May under
constant Japanese artillery and air bombardment. The Japanese
troops stormed ashore on the island, General Wainwright agreed
to surrender Corregidor and all other troops on the island. By
9 May 1942, the battle for the Philippines had ended,
though many Americans and Filipinos took to the hills and
continued a guerrilla war against the Japanese.
The
courageous defense of Bataan had ended. Marching them toward
camps in northern Luzon, the Japanese denied food and water to
the sick and starving men. When the weakest began to struggle,
guards shot or bayoneted them and threw the bodies on the side
of the road. Japanese guards may have killed 600 Americans and
10,000 Filipino prisoners. News of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor had outraged the American people, but news of the "Bataan
Death March" filled them with bitter hatred.
The Pacific was a naval war, and little U.S. Naval power was
required in the Atlantic. Aside from the U-boats, the Germans
posed no threat in the Atlantic waters. Almost the entire
British Navy was deployed in the Atlantic, thus, American naval
power could be committed to the Pacific war.
From the
beginning of the war, rivalry between the Army and the Navy
marked the conflict. The inter-service rivalries and great
distances prevented a single unified commander from being named.
Instead, the Pacific was divided into area commands. General
MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and Admiral Chester
Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas (POA). The POA, in turn, was
subdivided into North Pacific, Central Pacific, and South
Pacific commands. Admiral Nimitz retained commander of the
Central Pacific. General MacArthur became Supreme Commander
Allied Powers (SCAP) in the last days of the war.
Fighting in
the Pacific was unlike fighting in Europe. The Pacific was a
seemingly endless series of amphibious landings and
island-hopping campaigns where naval power, air power, and
shipping were of primary importance. The soldiers and marines
who assaulted the countless beaches in the Pacific war was
brutal and deadly. Japanese defenders always dug in, reinforced
their bunkers with coconut logs, and fought until they were
killed. They almost never surrendered.
Japan,
largely lacking of natural resources to feed its industries,
looked overseas for supplies of strategic materials such as ore
and petroleum. Before 1939, the U.S. was Japan's major supplier.
But President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull shut
off American supplies in an effort to force the Japanese to end
hostilities against China. The Japanese had long sought the
resource-rich British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia, and
as the U.S. trade embargo tightened, the Japanese increasingly
looked southward for raw material and strategic resources.
Only the U.S.
stood in Japan's path. The U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor
was the only force capable of challenging Japan's navy, and
American bases in the Philippines could threaten lines of
communications between the Japanese home islands and the East
Indies. Every oil tanker heading for Japan would have to pass by
American-held Luzon.
From these
needs and constraints, Japan's war plans emerged. First, its
navy would neutralize the American fleet with a surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, Japan would also seize American's Central
Pacific bases at Guam and Wake Islands. and invade the
Philippines. With American naval power crippled, Japan's
military would be free to seize Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and
the Dutch East Indies in a series of rapid amphibious
operations. Japan would the establish a defensive ring around
its newly conquered empire by fortifying islands in the south
and central Pacific. Japan's leaders were convinced the
Americans, once involved in the European war, would be willing
to negotiate peace in the Pacific.
To Block
Japanese ambitions, the U.S. Army had scant resources. Two small
forces, the garrison in the Territory of Hawaii and General
Douglas MacArthur's command in the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Both were only peacetime organizations. Yet, these
forces would face overwhelming odds in the event of war. The
thousands of islands that comprised the Philippines lay 8,000
miles from the American west coast, but only 200 miles from
Japanese held Formosa. To defend them, Gen. MacArthur had the
Philippine Scouts. He could call on additional thousands of
Philippine militia, but they were untrained and ill equipped.
Lt. General Walter C. Short's Hawaiian command held 43,000 Army
troops, including tow infantry divisions, coast artillery, air
corps and Support troops. The US had equivalent of three
divisions in the Pacific to stand in the path of the Imperial
Japanese Army.
American
strategists had developed two plans to counter possible Japanese
aggress-the Navy to fight across the central pacific for battle
with the Japanese fleet. The Army saw no way to save the
Philippines and favored a strategic defense along an
Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line. Seaman William Jewe was in the
U.S. Coast Guard manning these defensive
perimeter.
All of the
efforts proved to be too little, too late. The Japanese worked
to perfection. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese paralyzed the
Pacific Fleet in its attack on Pearl Harbor. In the Philippines,
Japanese fliers destroyed most of General MacArthur’s Japanese
air force on the ground. Japanese forces took Burma, Malaya,
Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies in rapid succession. By
March 1942, the Japanese had conquered an empire. Only
General MacArthur's American-Filipino army still held out on the
main island of Luzon.
A Japanese
army landed in northern Luzon on 22 December 1941 and
began to push southward toward Manila. Al first General
MacArthur was inclined to meet the Japanese on the beaches, but
he had no air force and the U.S. Navy's tiny Asiatic fleet was
in no position to challenge Japan at sea. The U.S. regulars and
Philippine Scouts were excellent
troops but were
outnumbered and without air support. General MacArthur decided
to withdraw to the Bataan peninsula. There he could pursue a
strategy of defense and delay, shortening his line and using the
mountainous, jungle-covered terrain to his advantage. Perhaps he
could even hold out long enough for a relief force to be mounted
in the U.S.
But too many
people were crowded into Bataan, with too little food and
ammunition. By March it was clear that help from the U.S. was
not coming. Nevertheless, the American-Filipino force, wracked
by dysentery and malaria, continued to fight. In March 1941,
President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur to escape to
Australia. He left his command to Lt. General Jonathan
Wainwright and to Major General Edward King, who on 9 April
was forced to surrender the exhausted and starving Bataan force.
General Wainwright continued to resist on the small fortified
island of Corregidor in Manila Bay until 6 May under
constant Japanese artillery and air bombardment. The Japanese
troops stormed ashore on the island, General Wainwright agreed
to surrender Corregidor and all other troops on the island. By
9 May 1942, the battle for the Philippines had ended,
though many Americans and Filipinos took to the hills and
continued a guerrilla war against the Japanese.
The
courageous defense of Bataan had ended. Marching them toward
camps in northern Luzon, the Japanese denied food and water to
the sick and starving men. When the weakest began to struggle,
guards shot or bayoneted them and threw the bodies on the side
of the road. Japanese guards may have killed 600 Americans and
10,000 Filipino prisoners. News of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor had outraged the American people, but news of the "Bataan
Death March" filled them with bitter hatred.
By May
1942, the Japanese had succeeded beyond their wildest
expectations. If their forces could move into the Solomon
Islands and the southern coast of New Guinea, they could
threaten Australia and cut the American line of communications
to MacArthur's base there. If they could occupy Midway Island,
only 1,000 miles from Honolulu, they could force the American
fleet to pull back to the west coast..
Japanese
overconfidence lay the seeds of Japan's first major defeat.
Japan's fortunes turned sour in mid-1942. Their uninterrupted
string of victories ended with history's first great carrier
battles.
(To
be continued)
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